Defense UAS

1. System Identity and Institutional Provenance

The Hadid-110 represents a pivot in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Ground Force’s strike doctrine. The platform marks a transition from the experimental unveiling of jet-powered loitering munitions to active institutional induction. While the IRGC has historically relied on the mass employment of low-cost, propeller-driven systems, the fielding of the Hadid-110 signals an intent to provide tactical ground units with organic, high-energy autonomy capable of penetrating modern, multi-layered Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS).

Nomenclature and Classification The system is identified by two primary designations depending on the reporting stream:

• Hadid-110: The standard nomenclature utilized in defense industrial exhibitions and state media including social media sources.
• Dalahu: The internal designation (variably rendered as “Dalaho” or “Dalahoo”) specifically associated with its delivery to the IRGC Ground Force.
• Classification: The Hadid-110 is categorized as a jet-powered, rocket-assisted “one-way attack” (OWA) UAV/loitering munition.

Developmental Timeline and Fielding (Calendar Year 2025) The progression of the Hadid-110 follows a compressed timeline from unveiling to operational exercise:

• Feb 13, 2025: Initial unveiling at the “Eqtedar 1403” (Power 2025) defense exhibition during a visit by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
• Feb 19, 2025: Reported induction into the IRGC Ground Force order of battle during the “Great Prophet 19” (Phase 2) exercises.
• March 6, 2025: Demonstrated in experimental maritime drills; international media reported claims of launches from unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs).
• Dec 1, 2025: Systematic employment in the “Sahand-2025” exercise in East Azerbaijan Province.
• December 6, 2025: Formal announcement of the first production batch delivery to the IRGC Ground Force.

The direct institutional backing by the IRGC suggests that the Hadid-110 is no longer a “boutique” project but a baseline capability for modernizing OWA drone arsenal.

2. Technical Profile: Jet Propulsion & Signature Management

The architectural shift from internal combustion/propeller systems to jet propulsion is a strategic response to the proliferation of low-cost point defenses. Propeller-driven OWA systems are increasingly vulnerable to mobile fire groups and light anti-aircraft systems; by adopting a micro-turbojet, the Hadid-110 significantly reduces the intercept window.

Design and Radar Signature Management

As systems architects, we note the platform’s delta-wing and “faceted” airframe. The “broken surfaces” suggest a deliberate attempt at planform alignment to degrade the radar cross-section (RCS). This shaping is likely optimized to target the X-band and S-band frequencies utilized by regional fire control radars, effectively delaying detection and shortening the distance at which a defender can achieve a reliable kinetic lock.

Propulsion and Launch Rationale

The platform utilizes a mini/micro turbojet engine. While the exact model remains unspecified, we speculate based on the 30 kg payload and 500 km/h performance bracket that the engine is either a domestic Toloue-4 analog or a reverse-engineered commercial turbojet (e.g., TJ100 clones). The high wing-loading inherent in this high-speed design necessitates a high stall-speed liftoff, which is achieved via Rocket-Assisted Launch (RALT). This allows the system to remain runway-independent, launching from mobile rails or tripods.

Confirmed Performance Parameters

3. Tactical Employment: The “Path-Opener” Doctrine

The IRGC frames the Hadid-110 as a “path-opener” to enable follow-on strikes. This doctrine seeks to disrupt the integrity of a layered defense before the arrival of a primary strike package by less sophisticated UAS like the Shahed-136. It is suggested that in the early stages of the 2026 Iran war that the Hadid-110 was used in this role against US C4ISR assets in the Gulf region.

Pillars of the Doctrine

1. Temporal Compression: The increased velocity (140+ m/s) forces an accelerated decision-making loop for IADS. Point-defense systems have roughly 50% less time to calculate lead and engage compared to a Shahed-136.
2. Saturation Interdependence: The Hadid-110 is designed for mixed-package raids. It forces the defender into a “lose-lose” engagement logic: the IADS must engage the high-speed Hadid-110, thereby revealing its radar position and depleting high-end interceptors, leaving it vulnerable to subsequent waves of slower, cheaper drones.
3. Launch Flexibility: Dispersed, ground-based mobile launchers complicate pre-launch targeting by regional ISR assets.

Maritime and UUV Launch Vectors Initial indicators regarding UUV-based deployment represent a significant potential escalation. However, skepticism is warranted of its operational maturity. Such a capability would require sophisticated underwater launch depth management and a complex terminal hand-off for telemetry as the drone transitions from water-exit to atmospheric flight. If achieved, it would allow for radical shifts in threat vectors, bypassing land-based early warning sensors

4. Comparative Benchmarking: Regional Strike Analogs

The Hadid-110 occupies a tactical niche: it is faster than traditional one-way attack drones but more cost-effective for ground forces than high-end cruise missiles.

Analysis of Differentiators While the Shahed-238 is a strategic asset with significant range, the Hadid-110 is optimized for theater-level ground operations. It is vastly faster than the Mini Harop, though the Harop maintains a superior “Guidance Certainty” due to its mature, operator-in-the-loop seekers. The Hadid-110’s utility remains contingent on whether it employs simple GNSS-based “fire-and-forget” logic or more advanced terminal seekers.

5. Vulnerability Mapping and Defensive Countermeasures

The transition to jet propulsion creates a new signature profile that defenders can exploit.

Critical Vulnerabilities

1. Thermal Cues: Micro-turbojets lack the bypass ratios of larger turbofans, meaning their core exhaust is exceptionally “hot” relative to their size. We assess this makes the Hadid-110 highly susceptible to IR-guided interceptors and EO/IR tracking, regardless of its radar-shaping.
2. Launch Signature: The RALT booster generates a high-visibility visual and thermal plume. For a defender with persistent ISR, this provides a definitive cue for immediate counter-battery fire against the launch site.
3. Guidance Frangibility: Like its predecessors, the system likely relies on GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) and INS. This makes it vulnerable to sophisticated electronic warfare, specifically GPS jamming and spoofing.

Layered Defense Framework

1. Multi-Modal Detection: Integrate short-range radar with passive RF and EO/IR sensors to negate RCS shaping.
2. Kinetic Defeat: Prioritize high-speed interceptors; mobile fire groups using small arms are likely insufficient against targets in the 500 km/h band.
3. Pre-Launch ISR: Target the “launch ecosystem,” specifically the logistics chain of solid-fuel boosters and mobile rails.

6. Intelligence Gaps and Strategic Collection Priorities

Current open source data is largely derived from state-linked demonstrations. Closing the following gaps is essential for refining defensive postures.

Critical Unknowns

• Guidance & C2 Architecture: Does it feature a “man-in-the-loop” datalink, or is it purely reliant on pre-programmed coordinates?
• Supply Chain Provenance: Identification of the origin of the micro-turbojet and microelectronics to assess sanction resilience.
• Warhead Lethality: Confirmation of fill types—HE-Frag vs. Tandem Shaped Charge for hardened targets.
• Operational Maturity: Distinguishing between exercise prototypes and high-volume production.

A priority for any technical intelligence units is the recovery and exploitation of the Navigation & Control Board. Forensics must determine if the system utilizes anti-jam Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPA) or relies on vulnerable, off-the-shelf M-code/S-code GPS modules.

Credible reports have displayed evidence of more sophisticated Russian anti-jamming GNSS modules in March 2026, likely indicating that Hadid-110 are similarly or better equipped given their role, though this is unconfirmed. Video posted from Bahrain in the opening days of the 2026 was with Iran possibly show some details of the interior components along with other drones, though not confirmed.

Strategic Summary The Hadid-110 “Dalahu” serves as a cost-imposition tool designed to force regional air defenses to utilize expensive, high-end interceptors against a mid-tier threat. Its role as a “path-opener” suggests that future Iranian strike salvos will be increasingly complex, utilizing speed to overwhelm the defensive decision-making cycle.

Point-defense low-cost multirotor based interceptors will face a narrow interception window when compared to slower OWA drones. This drone also presents a resilient threat against Gulf oil & water infrastructure, even with a smaller warhead than the Shahed-136 and Arash-2.