Venezuelan drone programs have undergone nearly two decades of layered capability development with Iranian help, moving from basic surveillance UAVs to an increasingly credible armed and loitering-munition fleet. Analysts now routinely describe it as the only Latin American state with an operational armed drone program, and one that is structurally tied to Iran’s sanctions-proof export strategy.
Origins & Early Developments
The roots of the Venezuelan military, known as the Bolivarian National Armed Forces or Fuerza Armada Nacional Bolivariana (FANB), drone programs lie in mid-2000s defense agreements with Tehran. In 2006–07, Caracas contracted with Iran’s Qods Aviation to assemble Mohajer-2 surveillance drones from knock-down kits through Venezuelan state-owned defense firms.
Assembly was done by CAVIM (Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares) at an industrial complex in Maracay, located on the north side of Lake Valencia, with Venezuelan personnel trained in Iran. This established a pattern as much of the FANB’s emerging drone-industrial programs rely on foreign technology transfers and components.
The locally branded Arpía UAV, essentially a licensed Mohajer-2/3 derivative, entered service with the Venezuelan Air Force around 2013 for border surveillance, counter-narcotics, and internal security.
That first phase was followed by gradual institutionalization. The Sant Arpía-1 project at the CAVIM Maracay complex formalized a domestic production line, while military planning documents called for “strengthening the UAV Arpía production unit.”
Between 2009–2016, these drones were mostly ISR platforms, but by roughly 2020 Caracas created Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional S.A. (EANSA) to oversee drone and aircraft production, coinciding with a resumption of activity at El Libertador Air Base under renewed Iranian support.
UAS Program 2022 – Independence Day Parade
The public inflection point came on 5 July 2022, when Venezuela rolled out two “Antonio José de Sucre” designs at the Independence Day parade: the ANSU-100 and ANSU-200. The ANSU-100 is an armed evolution of the Arpía, retaining the Mohajer-2 lineage but integrating Iranian Qaem guided bombs for air-to-ground strikes which is notable as Latin America’s first overtly armed military UAV.
The ANSU-200 is a flying-wing platform visually reminiscent of Iran’s Shahed-171 and its smaller derivatives, advertised for multi-role tasks including strike, counter-drone, and SEAD. Its exact maturity remains unclear, but satellite imagery and leaked contracting suggest sub-kits and low-rate production are under way, again with Iranian technical input.
Some reports have suggested that Iran has supplied more advanced systems directly, from an image of a Mohajer-6 drone at a EANSA facility in 2020. Tehran began mass production of the Mohajer-6 UCAV in 2018 and some open sources indicate at least a small number have been transferred to Venezuela, giving Caracas a combat-proven platform capable of carrying multiple Qaem munitions. Confidence is low on the extent of integration into FANB operations.
Recent reporting also describes a Zamora V-1 loitering munition, which is modeled on Iranian Shahed-131/136 designs, with a delta-wing form, RPG-7 warhead and ranges on the order of hundreds of kilometers, indicating a clear attempt to domesticate one-way attack drone concepts seen in Ukraine and the Middle East.
Venezuelan Drones | Significant UAS Programs
| Name | Notes / Origin |
| Arpía | Also known as the “Arpía-1”. Local Venezuelan version of the Iranian Mohajer‑2, assembled under license by CAVIM. |
| ANSU‑100 | Armed evolution of the Arpía line; shown publicly in Venezuela’s 2022 parade. Produced by CAVIM. Armed with Qaem-type munitions |
| ANSU‑200 | Larger flying-wing UAV variant unveiled alongside the ANSU-100, intended for multi-role/strike missions. |
| Mohajer‑6 | Iranian model reportedly transferred to Venezuela; gives Caracas a more capable armed-UAV capability. |
| Zamora V‑1 | A loitering-munitions/attack drone reportedly developed in Venezuela, modeled on Iranian/“Shahed-type” drones using RPG-7 warheads. |
| ANSU-500 | Based on the Iranian “Shahin VTOL” UAV, this smaller tactical system is capable of carrying small munitions or being used as a OWA. |
| ANSU “Yazdan” Clone | Small hand-launched fixed-wing tactical UAS derived from Iranian-made “Yazden” system. |
Evolution of Drone Warfare
Training and doctrine are evolving alongside hardware. Venezuelan media and social clips show FPV-style drone simulators at the Military Academy in Fuerte Tiuna, where cadets train on first-person-view interfaces and anti-drone “simulators,” indicating a broader move into tactical quadcopters and CUAS workflows influenced by lessons learned in the Russian-Ukraine Conflict.
A dedicated UAV battalion has been credited which according to unverified government narratives has been credited with roles such as detecting the 2020 “Operación Gedeón” seaborne incursion.
Strategically, the drone partnership serves both regimes. For Iran, Venezuela is a showcase market in the Western Hemisphere and a test-bed for exporting designs, production know-how, and OWA munitions beyond the Middle East.
For Caracas, Iranian technology offers a relatively low-cost way to restore deterrent capability under sanctions. Recent U.S. and European reporting notes Venezuelan requests for long-range drones (~1,000 km), GPS jammers, and other systems from Iran, framed by Maduro as a response to U.S. military pressure in the Caribbean and to disputes such as the Essequibo crisis with Guyana.
One-way attack (OWA) drones with this range could reach targets in Puerto Rico and possibly Guantanamo Bay. Such an attack is unlikely, though underscores the capability drones bring even to nations with a limited industrial base.
Taken together, the Arpía/ANSU series, imported Mohajer-6s, and Shahed-inspired Zamora V-1 give Venezuela a layered UAV portfolio from tactical ISR and FPV to armed UCAVs and loitering munitions. built explicitly on Iranian design and training pipelines and anchored in a domestic industrial base that is difficult to disrupt without striking Venezuelan territory.
