On the 7th of July, it was reported that an incident occurred 51NM west of Al Hudaydah, Yemen in the southern Red Sea involving a merchant ship MV Magic Seas. Another vessel around this time was attacked, the MV Eternity C. As a result of these attacks by Houthi forces, three mariners were killed with the complete loss of MV Magic Seas in a dramatic staged sinking filmed by a Houthi drone after the vessel was boarded and scuttled by Houthi Naval Forces. Updated 10 July: the Eternity C was also sunk in a similar video, with the loss of 4 mariners now confirmed.
Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs) may have taken part in the attack. The incident was described in the UK’s Maritime Trade Operations incident tracker, with a statement made by the US State Department regarding the incident. Drones are reported to be involved and at least small drones used to film operations have clearly been used. If other drones have been used in reconnaissance or surveillance efforts by Houthi forces it is unknown at this time, though not unlikely given previous operations.
The sinking marks the third vessel to have been sunk by Houthi forces since hostilities escalated in the later quarter of 2023. Even before this time though, the Houthi have been involved in a ongoing regional proxy war involving larger regional powers and have been under near continuous bombardment since 2015. This action filmed in such dramatic fashion may reignite Western involvement in the region, after previous military operations were largely inconclusive in March of 2025.
Assessing Houthi War-making Capabilities
Often described as a militant group, rebels or terrorists in Western media, the Houthi control a region roughly corresponding to the now defunct state of North Yemen, which joined with South Yemen to form the Republic of Yemen. This region, depending on sources is home to some 20 million people or more and the third of the Yemen they do control holds fertile farmland and significant urban centers.
This is important to consider when assessing the Houthi’s capabilities as the image conjured up by the term “militant group” or “rebels” may bias western audiences to underestimate the war making capacity of the quasi-state actor. Far from a tribal militia, the Houthi have a limited manufacturing industrial capable of producing drones, ballistic missiles, improvised naval mines and unmanned surface vessels.
Simplified Map of the Reality of Power in Yemen (2025)
| Faction | Territory | Population | External Backer | Legitimacy |
| Houthis (Ansar-Allah) |
Most of former North Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, highlands, and partial access to Red Sea coast, including the port of Al-Hudaydah | ~20-24 million people | Iran | Not Recognized |
| Republic of Yemen / Hadi-aligned government | In exile, some eastern & central regions with nominal access to Aden Port and Mukalla Port. | < 5 million | Saudi Arabia | Officially Recognized |
| Southern Transitional Council (STC) | Most of former South Yemen, including major port city Aden. | ~4-6 million, fragmented control | UAE | Not Recognized |
| Other Actors (AQAP, tribal forces, ISIS) | Pockets, expanded since US strikes | ~2,000 | None | Not Recognized |
Outlook and Future Attacks
Previous attempts to deter the Houthi from attacking vessels they deem to have broken their blockade of Israel have not been successful, with Operation Rough Rider taking place in spring of 2025 having no impact on Houthi operations despite numerous sorties flown by the US Navy and US Air Force. No statement has been made yet on whether the US or any other nation will respond to this and other attacks.
The US Navy and US Coast Guard frequently conduct their own boarding operations termed “Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure” or VBSS mostly in the Arabian Sea in attempts to interdict supplies to Houthi controlled areas, which has not shown any impact on Houthi operations. The ability to operate in small launches indicates there is very little naval presence deterring these attacks. In any case, shipping is at serious risk in this region and will remain so for the foreseeable future. More attacks are suspected to continue, which will likely feature drones to some degree, even if just to film the aftermath of boarding operations.
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