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Defense UAS

Evolution of Unmanned Systems Forces

The move comes after two years of rapid battlefield evolution: thousands of FPV drones, commercial quadcopters, and improvised loitering munitions have turned the skies over Ukraine into a dense and dynamic battlespace. If Zelenskyy’s own words are to be considered, there have been over 2 million drones used a year in Ukraine. These are mostly of the small consumer-grade variety. Ukraine continues to operate systems like the Bayraktar TB2 and has operated similar larger systems in the past. In the opening days of the war, the TB2 saw some success though fortunes for drones of this size changed as air defenses rapidly made operation of large expensive drones difficult near the front lines. The world has seen a shift in the conflict to small disposable quadcopters, which have become ubiquitous in the current stage of the conflict. Ukraine has also fielded almost innumerable UAV types including: standardized small quadcopters, reusable heavy-multirotors, locally made fixed wing ISR drones, interceptor drones, and long-range strike drones.

It should be noted, though obviously not the focus of UDS Aviation, that the USF concerns itself with all domains of operation when it comes to unmanned systems. Colonel Sukharevkey is noted for having a passion for ground systems, many seeing use in Ukraine, as well as maritime drones that have proven to be an asymmetric challenge to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. What has become a staple of the war though has been the small quadcopters and other drones in daily use at the forward edge of the battle area in Ukraine. The establishment of the Unmanned Systems Forces is likely to help coordinate the nebulous cloud of improvised drones into a more cohesive fighting force, with the goal of providing an asymmetric, cost-effective means to win a a war of attrition against their Russian opponent.

Each strike systematically weakens the enemy’s offensive potential, stripping russia [sic] of the resources needed to sustain its war against Ukraine.
– Unmanned Systems Forces Official Website

Force Structure

Unmanned Systems Forces operates across the entire front line of Ukraine, as well as integrating itself into Ukraine’s military industries and establishing training commands. Official publications and assessments by western sources indicated manning is around 5,000 soldiers. while units operating unmanned systems continue to exist in branches it seems, the USF has their own war-fighting components.

Officially Named Units:

412th Regiment of Unmanned Systems “Nemesis”
413th Battalion of Unmanned Systems “Raid”
424th Battalion of Unmanned Systems “Svarog”
14th Unmanned Aerial Systems Regiment
“Flying Skull” Battalion of Unmanned Systems
59th Assault Brigade of Unmanned Systems “Steppe Predators”
9th Brigade of Unmanned Systems

Tactical UAS Dominance

Ukraine’s military may be the undisputed world leader in small unmanned systems operations and tactics, with complex operations deep inside Russia, such as Operation Spiderweb to daily integrated use of small “suicide” or “kamikaze” drones with videos of these operations frequently posted on social media. Due to problems with operating in a contested electronic warfare environment, the Russo-Ukraine War has seen the introduction of fiber-optic controlled drones, carrying a spool of fiber-optic cable. Tactics continue to evolve and the attempts to systematize them are seemingly apart of the USF’s mission.

Ukraine has established a system of rewarding drone operators with a point-based system for targets, in a manner some have considered to be a gamification of war. Soldiers are even allowed access to a web retailer experience that allows them to redeem points for new equipment. In truth any military will establish targeting priorities, though this system may refelt. What this points system really represents isn’t a detachment from violence so much as an elaborate method of rationing. Unlocking the best gear wouldn’t be important if logistics allowed easy access to everyone.

The close integration of Ukraine’s armed forces in the use of UAS to their domestic war industry has been noted by western media sources as well as the Russians themselves. This method of rapid innovation and integration into operational use has drawn many comparisons to the tech industry in the US and the Silicon Valley approach of move fast and break things. Solving daily tactical problems like this certainly has advantages in the current state of the war in Ukraine, it has its limits both structurally and strategically in warfare. Creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces is an administrative indication that those weaknesses have been recognized and are seeking their own solutions.

Strategic Weaknesses

While designs and development of small systems occurs at a rapid pace, the biggest vulnerability for the USF and for mass drone warfare in general is the dependency on imported Chinese parts. There is no substitute for Chinese mass production, it isn’t that the technology can’t be produced elsewhere, but not at the often quoted $500 for one small expendable drone. Tactics and strategy are constrained by logistics, should any number of factors cause costs to shift, then many of the tactics developed by the USF will be unsustainable and other weapons platforms will need to be considered.

The official website of Unmanned Systems Forces also curiously states that “most important value is human life” on their main landing page. An obviously benefit of a focus on unmanned systems is the protection these technologies offer while being able to strike at one’s opponent without risk. Ukraine has struggled with recruitment and manpower concerns since the start of the conflict. This shift to focus on unmanned systems may be a reflection of this. Translating the various pages of units from Unmanned Systems Forces it is clear that the AFU in general seeks to cultivate talent internally and avoid losses of personnel through these technologies.

Yet even as Ukraine leads the world in integrating drones at the tactical level, it remains constrained in strategic reach, though the official website of the military branch states that it can strike up to 2,000 km deep into Russia. The formation of the Unmanned Systems Forces may streamline operations, but the absence of long-range, survivable deep strike platforms remains a critical vulnerability. Even the USAF’s Strategic Air Command of the 1950s and 60s with the use of a nuclear arsenal was predicted to struggle eliminating then-Soviet war production industry which could reconstitute itself in the vast Russian interior in weeks to a few months.

Social Media Post from the USF depicting a deep strike into Russia targeting drone component manufacturer. — X Post from the **Unmanned Systems Forces** depicting a deep strike into Russia. *Source Official USF X account*

The Future of the Unmanned Systems Forces and Ukraine

In terms of domestic production capacity for long-range strike weapons, Russia still maintains a significant edge and is expanding on this with their own local drone production. As of mid-2025, it is a gap Russia continues to exploit with cruise missile, ballistic missiles, and the evolving Geran-2 drones. Ukraine has shown precision when striking at Russia’s own production facilities, often deep inside Russia, though even given the limitations of strategic air campaigns throughout history in impacting production in meaningful ways, the ability to reach targets doesn’t mean they can be meaningfully degraded in terms of output. By their own admission, the USF is apart of an asymmetric war of attrition. Ukraine’s drone revolution is real, but will need to overcome some significant challenges to shift the balance of power as of mid-2025.

References

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Ukraine Government – Unmanned Systems Forces
Unmanned Systems Forces – Official Website

This article contains material used under the fair use provisions of Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, for purposes of commentary, analysis, and education. All rights remain with the original copyright holders.